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To Peat Mine or Not to Peat Mine: The Supreme Court’s Opportunity
to Determine if a “Clean Water Act” Approved Jurisdictional
Determination Affects a Landowner’s Legal Rights
Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. United States Army of Engineers1
Garrett Pratt

I. INTRODUCTION
The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) requires a landowner to receive a
permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) before he
or she comducts any activity on his or her land if that activity may affect
“waters of the United States.”2 Why, then, would a Corps officer determine
that a parcel of land – located over 100 miles away from qualifying
jurisdictional waters – is subject to CWA permitting? Moreover, when a
landowner appeals such a determination and a reviewing Corps officer
decides that the Corps’ local office was incorrect, why is it acceptable for the
Corps to do no additional investigation and hold that its “Approved
Jurisdictional Determination” (“AJD”) is accurate and final?
This is the current situation of Hawkes Company, Inc. (“Hawkes”).
Hawkes filed a lawsuit against the Corps and the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) seeking judicial review of the Corps’ AJD as a “final
agency action” under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The Corps
maintains that an AJD is not a “final agency action” under the APA because
an AJD does not affect a landowner’s “legal rights or obligations, [n]or is a
decision from which legal consequences flow.”3 Hawkes contends that its
legal rights and obligations are substantially affected by its AJD.4

1

782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
3
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).
4
Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 996.
2
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In 2015, there were two cases on writ of certiorari before the United
States Supreme Court, each reaching a different conclusion concerning
whether a landowner may receive judicial review of a Corps’ AJD.5 The
Court should resolve this split by affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Hawkes Co., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, which correctly
determined that an AJD affects a landowner’s legal rights.
This note will outline the facts in Hawkes, the relevant legal history
on the intersection of the CWA and the APA, and the Eighth Circuit’s legal
analysis in Hawkes. This note’s discussion of Hawkes supports the
conclusions that: (1) an AJD affects a landowner’s legal rights; (2) judicial
review is an effective incentive for the Corps to ensure the accuracy of AJD;
(3) judicial review ensures the accuracy of AJD; (4) and alternatively, to
avoid judicial review, the EPA could create a second AJD administrative
appeal before a landowner brings a lawsuit against the agencies.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellant, Hawkes Co., Inc. (“Hawkes”), is a peat-mining company
located in northwestern Minnesota.6 Hawkes desired to expand its peatmining activities to a nearby 530-acre parcel of wetland (“the parcel”) owned
by two of Hawkes’ affiliated companies.7 Under Minnesota law, peat mining
is a “wetland dependent” activity regulated by permits granted by the local
Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) and other state and federal regulatory
agencies.8 The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) defines a “jurisdictional wetland”
as a parcel of land subject to permitting regulations “as waters of the United
States.”9

5

Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 994 cert. granted, 136 S.Ct. 615 (2015); Kent Recycling Services v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers petition for cert. filed 2014 WL 5475208 (U.S.);
cert. refiled sub nom Kent Recycling Services v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
761 F.3d 383 (2015); cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015).
6
Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 996.
7
Id. at 998. Pierce Investment Co. (“Pierce”) and LPF Properties, LLC (“LPF”) are closelyheld corporations owned by members of the Pierce family. Id.
8
Id. at 997. The development of wetlands in Minnesota is also subject to regulations and
permits required by Environmental Protection Agency and the Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources (“MDNR”). Id.
9
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7) (2014)).
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In December 2010, Hawkes began the CWA permit application
process with the Corps’ local office.10 After Hawkes filed its permit
application, Corps officials repeatedly indicated to Hawkes, from January to
August 2011, that it should abandon its expansion plans because the
permitting process would be expensive, lengthy, and it was uncertain whether
Hawkes would receive a permit.11 In a draft Jurisdictional Determination, the
Corps concluded that the parcel was connected to a “relatively permanent
water source” via a series of culverts and unnamed streams that flowed into
the Middle River, which flowed into the Red River — a river located 120
miles away from the parcel.12 Hawkes found this determination extreme and
questioned its accuracy.13 Hawkes’ environmental consultant cited several
errors in the Corps’ analysis.14 Nevertheless, the Corps released its Approved
Jurisdictional Determination (“AJD”) in February 2012, affirming that the
parcel was a jurisdictional wetland because a “significant nexus” existed
between the parcel and the Red River.15
Hawkes filed a timely administrative appeal of the AJD, and in
October 2012, the Corps’ Deputy Commanding General for Civil and
Emergency Operations sustained Hawkes’ appeal.16 The Corps’ reviewing
officer remanded the matter for reconsideration because the Corps had not
amassed sufficient “[factual] support … to determine that the [parcel]
contained jurisdictional wetlands and waters.”17 However, the Corps, in
December 2012, issued an amended AJD reaffirming its position that the
parcel contained jurisdictional wetlands without providing additional
information.18 The AJD also stated that Hawkes had exhausted its

10

Id. at 998.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
11
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administrative remedies, and that the present determination was the Corps’
final jurisdictional decision concerning the parcel.19
Hawkes subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Corps seeking
judicial review of the AJD in the United States District Court of Minnesota.20
The Corps moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Hawkes had not
exhausted its administrative remedies because the AJD was not a “final
agency action.”21 The district court applied the two-prong test in Bennett v.
Spear22 to determine if the Corps’ AJD was a “final agency action” under the
APA. The court found that the Corps’ AJD met the first prong of the Bennett
test because the AJD reflected the “consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking process.”23 However, the second prong of the Bennett test, that the
agency’s decision affected the legal rights of the aggrieved party, was not
met because the Corps’ decision did not require Hawkes to take any sort of
action.24 Additionally, the court stated that Hawkes could continue in the
CWA permit process or pursue its mining operations on the parcel without a
CWA permit, but it would assume the potential risk of incurring CWA
penalties.25 Because the Bennett test was not met, the AJD was not subject to
judicial review. The AJD was not a final agency action, and the district court
dismissed Hawkes’ action, which Hawkes timely appealed to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.26
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s motion to dismiss and
reversed the decision.27 As such, precedent was established that a Corps’

19

Id.
Id. at 994.
21
Id. (citing Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 963 F.Supp.2d 868, 871,
878 (D. Minn. 2013)).
22
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997). First, the action must mark the
consummation of the agency's decision-making process — it must not be of a merely
tentative or interlocutory nature. Id. Second, the action must be one by which rights or
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow. Id.
23
Hawkes, 963 F.Supp.2d at 871.
24
Id. at 873-74 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997)).
25
Id. at 875.
26
Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 999.
27
Id.
20
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AJD is a final agency action that qualifies for immediate judicial review
because it affects a landowner’s legal rights and obligations.28

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This section outlines the legislative history and the relevant statutory
and regulatory components of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The section concludes with a
discussion of the only cases that have assessed whether a CWA Approved
Jurisdictional Determination (“AJD”) is a “final agency action.”29
A. Competing Definitions of “Jurisdictional Waters” Under the
“Clean Water Act”
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 to restore and maintain the
“chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters” and to
acknowledge and ensure “the primary responsibilities and rights of the States
. . . to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.”30 The
CWA prohibits the discharge of pollution into “the navigable waters of the
United States” without a permit.31 A landowner who makes an unpermitted
discharge is subject to an Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
compliance order, and can be fined up to $75,000 for each day he or she is in
violation of the CWA.32

28

Id.
Two cases were before the Supreme Court in its 2016 session: (1) Hawkes Co., Inc., et al
v. United States Army of Engineers, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015); and (2) Belle Co., LLC v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers petition for cert. filed 2014 WL 5475208 (U.S.); cert. refiled
sub nom Kent Recycling Services v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383
(2015) cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015). However, the Supreme Court denied Certioari in
Kent Recycling. Id.
30
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)-(b) (2012).
31
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344 (2012).
32
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)(3), (d) (2012).
29
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The CWA’s jurisdiction only extends to “navigable waters of the
United States.”33 This phrase was not defined within the CWA and has been
subject to two interpretations over its 40-year history: (1) the traditional
definition and (2) the Corps/EPA modern definition.34 Prior to the CWA,
“navigable waters of the United States” meant “interstate waters that are
‘navigable in fact’ or readily susceptible of being rendered so.”35 The
traditional definition construed water narrowly to only include “relatively
permanent bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through
which water occasionally . . . flows.”36 The United States Supreme Court
expanded the traditional definition of “navigable waters” to include wetlands
that are physically adjacent to traditional navigable waters.37 Specifically, the
Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Rapanos v. United States held that the
traditional definition, with the physically adjacent wetlands expansion, is the
only definition consistent with the CWA’s stated policy goals.38
On the other hand, the modern Corps/EPA definition is far more
expansive than the traditional definition. While the Corps and the EPA
initially adopted the traditional definition, the agencies have significantly
expanded the statute’s meaning to include “virtually any land feature over
which rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible mark.”39 Presently,
the Corps and the EPA intentionally allow local Corps offices to have their
own interpretations.40 As a result, there is great variation in definitions across
local Corps offices.41
B. The Two-Prong Bennett v. Spear Test
The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) was adopted in 1946,
and it ensures protection of the constitutional rights of those who are subject
to an administrative agency’s regulation.42 The APA permits judicial review
33

33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012).
See generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
35
Id. at 723 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870)).
36
Id. at 716.
37
Id. at 734-35 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131
(1985)).
38
Id. at 731-32.
39
Id. at 725 (citing 33 CFR §328.3(e) (2014)).
40
Id. at 727.
41
Id.
42
Pat McCarran, Congressional Record Citation, March 12, 1946. “[T]he purpose of which
34
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of a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court.”43 Through this legislation, Congress intended that judicial review be
widely available to challenge federal agency actions.44 The Supreme Court in
Bennett v. Spear created a two-prong test to determine if an agency action
was final. First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency's
decision-making process — it must not be of a merely tentative or
interlocutory nature.45 Second, the action must be one by which rights or
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will
flow.46
C. Case Law is Split on Whether an AJD is a “Final Agency Action”
Only two cases have addressed whether an AJD is a final agency
action under the two-prong Bennett test. The Supreme Court determined that
an AJD is a final agency action in Sackett v. EPA and held that it is not in
Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.47 First, in Sackett v. EPA,
the EPA issued a compliance order to a landowner who filled one half-acre of
her land with dirt and rock while building a house.48 The EPA claimed that
the landowner polluted waters subject to EPA permitting requirements.49 If
the landowner did not comply, she would have been subject to fines of up to
$75,000 per day she was in violation.50 The landowner sought judicial review
of the compliance order and its underlying AJD.51
is to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure, is a
bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands of Americans whose affairs are controlled or
regulated in one way or another by agencies of the Federal government. It is designed to
provide guarantees of due process in administrative procedure.” Id.
43
5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
44
See generally Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see also Block v. Community
Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (affirming that the APA creates a “presumption
favoring judicial review of administrative action”).
45
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
46
Id.
47
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012); Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2014).
48
Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012).
49
Id. at 1371.
50
Id. at 1372.
51
Id. at 1374.
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The Supreme Court held that the compliance order was a final agency
action that satisfied the two-prong Bennett test.52 First, the EPA’s issuance of
the compliance order represented the consummation of its decision-making
process because the pronouncement that the landowner’s property was
subject to CWA permitting was not subject to any further agency review.53
The Court determined the agency’s decision-making was final even though
the EPA had not filed a civil enforcement action against the landowner.54
Second, the Court said that the landowner’s legal rights and obligations were
affected by the EPA’s compliance order because the landowner had to restore
her property according to the agency’s requirements, permit the EPA access
to her property, and potentially pay “double penalties in future enforcement
proceedings.”55 The Court stated that the APA’s presumption of judicial
review was not preempted by any CWA provision that would result in
“strong-arming . . . regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the
opportunity for judicial review — even judicial review of the question
whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.”56
The second case which has addressed whether an AJD is a final
agency action is Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.57 In Belle,
a landowner sought judicial review of a Corps AJD that would force the
landowner to receive a CWA permit before it could use a portion of the
property as a landfill.58 The Fifth Circuit determined that the AJD represented
the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process for the same
reasons the Supreme Court outlined in Sackett.59 However, the Fifth Circuit
determined that the second prong of the Bennett test was not satisfied because
the AJD did not affect the landowner’s legal rights or obligations in the same
manner as the EPA compliance order in Sackett.60 The Fifth Circuit gave four
reasons why the two cases were distinguishable.

52

Id.
Id. at 1372.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1371-72.
56
Id. at 1374.
57
Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2014).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 389.
60
Id. at 391.
53
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First, an AJD alone does not obligate the landowner to take or abstain
from taking any action on his or her property.61 The court reinforced its
analysis by claiming that prior to Sackett, all courts addressing the issue
determined that an AJD did not sufficiently affect the legal rights or
obligations of a party.62 Second, an AJD does not generate “a penalty
scheme” or compel the landowner’s compliance with the determination.63
Third, an AJD does not independently preclude the landowner from obtaining
necessary permits.64 Fourth, the landowner in Sackett had dumped material
into wetlands in violation of the CWA and was consequently liable for
incurring penalties.65 The court stated that Belle seeking judicial review of
the AJD was inconsistent with the established regulatory review procedure.66
The court also noted the court would discourage the Corps from providing an
AJD before a landowner became subject to a compliance order or an
enforcement action for a CWA violation.67 As a result, the landowner could
not receive judicial review of the AJD.68
Hawkes is factually similar to Belle because both cases touch upon
whether a landowner may receive judicial review of a Corps’ AJD. Both
appellate court opinions also agreed that the determinations represented the
consummation of the Corps’ decision-making process. However, the Fifth
Circuit in Belle held that an AJD does not affect a landowner’s legal rights
and obligations, whereas the Eighth Circuit in Hawkes determined that it
does.69 Both cases characterize the policy objectives of the APA and the
CWA differently, and both claim its interpretation of Sackett is superior.70

61

Id. at 390.
Id. at 391.
63
Id. at 392.
64
Id. at 393.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 394.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2015);
Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2014).
70
Compare Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 996-97,
1000 (8th Cir. 2015) with Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390,
392 (5th Cir. 2014).
62
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit determined that Hawkes’ Clean Water Act
(“CWA”) Approved Jurisdictional Determination (“AJD”) was a final agency
action subject to judicial review.71 The court applied the two-prong Bennett
test72 to determine if the AJD was a final agency action: “[T]he action must
mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process . . . [and]
the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined,
or from which legal consequences flow.”73
First, the Eighth Circuit determined the first prong of the Bennett test
was met because CWA regulations state that an AJD constitutes a Corps’
final agency action.74 The court also cited a Corps Regulatory Guidance
Letter that stated an AJD may be “relied on by a landowner, permit applicant,
or other affected party.”75 Second, the Eighth Circuit determined that Hawkes
satisfied the second prong of the Bennett test because Hawkes’ legal rights
and obligations were determined by the Corps’ AJD.76 The Eighth Circuit
gave four reasons why the AJD affected Hawkes’ legal rights and
obligations.
The court first cited the significant cost, time delay, and unlikely
positive outcome to Hawkes if it were to pursue completing the permit
process.77 The Eighth Circuit relied on Rapanos v. United States, in which
the Supreme Court found that the Corps permit applicants generally spend
more than three-quarters of a million dollars and two years to complete the
permitting process.78 The court was also unwilling to deny Hawkes judicial
review when the record indicated that multiple Corps officials told Hawkes
that it inevitably would be denied a permit.79 This alone satisfied the second
prong of the Bennett test, because Hawkes would never be able to recover

71

Hawkes Co., Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id.
73
Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)).
74
Id. (citing 33 CFR § 320.1(a)(6) (2012)).
75
Id. (quoting Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08–02, at 2, 5).
76
Id. at 1000-01
77
Id. at 1001.
78
Id. (citing Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006)).
79
Id.
72
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lost time or money in seeking a permit it was not legally obligated to
obtain.80
The second reason the Eighth Circuit determined that the AJD
affected Hawkes’ legal rights was that the AJD increased the penalties
Hawkes would incur if it mined without a permit.81 The court rejected the
Corps’ argument that Hawkes had an adequate remedy in choosing to
commence peat-mining without a permit because doing so would force it to
await agency enforcement and cause Hawkes to incur significant criminal
penalties, including imprisonment, for knowingly violating the CWA.82
When the district court agreed with this argument, it grossly mischaracterized
the regulatory action’s force and conflated the difference between an agency
action that “compels affirmative action and an order that prohibits a party
from taking otherwise lawful action.”83 The Eighth Circuit also stated that the
district court’s determination was inconsistent with relevant Supreme Court
precedent.84 Ultimately, because of “the [CWA’s] draconian penalties
80

Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1000.
84
Id. at 1000-01. First, the court cited that in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158 (1997), a
Fish and Wildlife Service biological opinion that made compliance with its orders mandatory
on the Bureau of Reclamation met the second part of the Bennett test because the agency
opinion had “direct and appreciable legal consequences.” Id. at 1000 (quoting Bennett, 520
US at 158). In the instant case, the AJD required Hawkes to either pay the significant fees
associated with the permitting process, give up its pursuit of using its land for peat-mining,
or proceed to mine but incur substantial enforcement penalties. Id.
Second, prescription drug labeling regulations constituted a judicially reviewable
final agency action because they “purport to give an authoritative interpretation of a statutory
provision” that places drug companies in a catch-22 of either incurring massive compliance
costs or risking criminal and civil penalties for violating the regulation. Id. (quoting Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1967)).
Third, the Supreme Court held in Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S.
40, 76 (1956), that an Interstate Communications Commission order claiming that certain
types of agricultural commodities were subject to regulations requiring carriers to obtain a
permit to transport such materials was a reviewable final agency action. Id. at 1000. The
court held this even though the order was issued generally to all interstate transporters of
agricultural commodities and enforcement would only occur when the Commission would
identify a non-complying entity and later bring an enforcement action against the carrier
because the order had an immediate and practical impact because of the risk of penalties. Id.
81
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imposed for the sort of violations alleged in this case . . . [the CWA] leaves
most property owners with little practical alternative but to dance to the EPA
[or the Corps’] tune.”85
Further, the Eighth Circuit’s third reason that the AJD affected
Hawkes’ legal rights was that the record strongly indicated that the Corps
intended to prevent Hawkes’ peat-mining operation from commencing and
avoid judicial scrutiny of the accuracy of its AJD.86 The court acknowledged
that the Corps’ own officers, on appeal, determined the AJD was
insufficient.87 The Corps has granted broad authority to local Corps
representatives in determining the agency’s jurisdiction.88 Therefore, by
allowing such unchecked authority, it would make it nearly impossible for
parties potentially subject to regulation to challenge these administrative
decisions by judicial review.89 The Eighth Circuit explained that the Corps
has intentionally given local Corps offices broad discretion to claim
permitting restrictions, which has led to claims of jurisdiction on “adjacent
wetlands . . . connected to navigable water by flooding . . . [occurring once
every century].”90 Allowing such unfettered agency authority to remain
judicially unchecked is inapposite to the APA’s presumption of immediate

In the present case, the court noted that the Corps’ AJD is more likely to affect the
substantial rights of Hawkes than the order in Frozen Food Express because the
jurisdictional determination pertained to Hawkes specifically and its property and violation
of the action would guarantee Hawkes’ civil and criminal liability, whereas the order in
Frozen Food Express was only a general order to all carriers. Id.
Fourth, Columbia Broadcasting v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), held that a
Federal Communications Commission regulation that barred the licensing of stations that
entered into network contracts, though not self-executing, was subject to immediate judicial
review because the regulation would effectively change and adversely impact the appellant’s
contractual rights and business relationships. Id. at 1000-01 (citing Columbia Broadcasting,
316 U.S. at 422). The court in the instant case drew strong parallels between these two cases
because the jurisdictional determination has impacted Hawkes’ lawful use of its property to
conduct a lawful business. Id. at 1000-01. The court again cited Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct.
1367, 1372 (2012), to underscore that final agency actions are not only reviewable when they
are self-executing. Id. at 1001.
85
Id. at 1002 (quoting Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J. concurring)).
86
Id. at 998.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1001-02.
89
Id.
90
Id. (citing Rapanos v. United States 547 U.S. 715, 727-28 (2006)).
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judicial review of final agency actions91 and inconsistent with the APA’s
legislative intent.92
Finally, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that continuance of such an
unfettered agency power exerted over private land owners was difficult to
reconcile in a nation that values due process and private property.93
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded
the case for further proceedings.94 Circuit Judge Jane Kelly filed a concurring
opinion in which she distinguished the factual circumstances of the present
case from Sackett.95 Judge Kelly nevertheless concluded that immediate
judicial review of the Corps determination was warranted because review of
whether a piece of land is under the jurisdiction of the CWA is the very
reason the Supreme Court in Sackett deemed jurisdictional determinations as
judicially reviewable.96
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court should affirm Hawkes and disagree with
Belle.97 Specifically, the Court should hold that an Approved Jurisdictional
Determination (“AJD”) affects a party’s legal rights and, therefore, makes it a
“final agency action” subject to immediate judicial review. Six legal
arguments support this position. Two policy arguments also support the
conclusion that judicial review of an AJD serves as an effective limitation
upon the Corps and the EPA’s (collectively “the agencies”) broad discretion
over the definition of jurisdictional “waters of the United States.” It also
incentivizes Corps officers to ensure the accuracy of its AJD. Alternately, if
the agencies want to avoid judicial review, they should create an additional
91

Id.
Id. at 999. Congress intended that judicial review be “widely available to challenge actions
of federal administrative officials.” Id. at 999 (quoting Califano v. Sanders 430 U.S. 99, 104
(1977)).
93
Id. at 1002 (citing Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J. concurring)).
94
Id. at 1002.
95
Id. at 1002-03 (Kelly, J. concurring).
96
Id.
97
Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom. Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015).
92
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administrative appeal for landowners to contest an AJD. Whether the
agencies create the additional administrative appeal or not, judicial review of
Corps AJD should be available to landowners.
A. An AJD Affects the Conduct of Landowners,
Third Parties, and Agencies
Clean Water Act (“CWA”) regulations and Corps administrative
guidance documents reveal that the agencies intend an AJD to be legally
binding upon landowners, third parties, and agencies themselves. This
weakens the Corps’ position when it claims that an AJD does not affect the
landowner. CWA regulations state that a local Corps officer’s assessment of
a land’s potential for CWA jurisdiction “shall constitute a Corps final agency
action”98 so that “the public can rely on that determination as a Corps final
agency action.”99 Indeed, the Corps and the EPA state that “decisions
concerning whether or not a waterbody is subject to the CWA have
consequences for State, tribal, and local governments, and for private
parties.”100 A Corps Regulatory Letter explains a landowner or other
“affected party”101 may rely on an AJD if he or she brings a federal civil
action contesting the accuracy of an AJD.102 An AJD is also binding on the
agencies.103 The combination of the agencies’ intention to bind themselves to
an AJD, the significant time and resources a local Corps office invests in an
AJD, and the Corps’ creation of an immediate administrative appeal for a
landowner to contest an AJD strongly indicate that an AJD “mean[s]
something – for landowners and regulators alike.”104
The Corps’ argument that a landowner’s rights are not affected by the
Corps’ positive determination that it has CWA jurisdiction over the land is
contrary to the Corps’ position that it intends for an AJD to be final and
98
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Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Eng’rs, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,207
(Nov. 13, 1986).
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101
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs RGL 08-02, at 2 (quoting 33 CFR § 331.2 (2014)).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Appellee at 13, Hawkes Co. Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3067), 2013 WL 6221825 at *13.
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relied upon by the landowner. The Corps has indicated that it intends an AJD
be final and relied upon by a landowner in use of his or her property.
Additionally, when land is determined to be under CWA jurisdiction, the
Corps has indicated third parties, the public at large, the Corps, and the EPA
should rely on the Corps’ determination. One likely reason that the Corps
maintains such contrary positions is that it is attempting to avoid judicial
review of its AJDs. If the Corps ever had to litigate against a landowner
contesting its jurisdiction, the Corps would very likely attempt to argue that
its “conclusions of jurisdiction are entitled to the benefit of significant
deference,” therefore avoiding a court’s intense scrutiny.105 The Corps in
Hawkes likely wants to avoid judicial review because it erroneously
authorized an AJD even though the local Corps officers provided no
additional facts to prove the Corps’ jurisdiction over Hawkes’ parcel.106 The
Eighth Circuit also suggested that the Corps may try to avoid judicial review
of its AJD to preserve its autonomy in making such determinations.107 The
Court should reject the Corps’ argument that an AJD is not a final agency
action because the Corps treats an AJD as a final agency decision that affects
a landowner, third parties, and the agencies themselves.
B. An AJD Affects a Landowner’s Use of His or Her Land
The second reason an affirmative CWA AJD affects a landowner’s
legal rights and obligations is that an AJD significantly affects a landowner’s
use of his or her land. An AJD changes the land’s potential regulatory burden
and the land’s fair market value.108 An AJD affirming the presence of
jurisdictional waters likely indicates the landowner must seek a CWA permit
to use the land in any form. Estimated CWA permitting costs can be as high
105

Id. See also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (“[A]n agency's
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v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)); see also Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army
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as $300,000 and the permitting process may take between one109 and twoand-a-half years.110 Landowners may incur additional costs and time delays
by modifying their plans for the land’s use, or they may have to abandon use
of the property altogether.111 This was the impression local Corps officers
gave Hawkes on multiple occasions.112 A landowner may also incur
additional costs to meet avoidance, minimization, and mitigation
requirements under CWA regulations.113 These costs vary114 and may range
between $400,000 and $1 million per acre.115
Third, a CWA jurisdiction determination may affect the property’s
fair market value.116 In one instance, a CWA jurisdiction determination
reduced a land parcel’s appraisal from $32 million to $1 million dollars.117
Tax assessments and Security and Exchange Commission reporting
requirements may also indirectly and significantly affect a land’s fair market
109
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value.118 The decrease in the fair market value reflects the use limitations an
AJD imposes on land. Given this, an AJD affects a landowner’s ability to use
his or her land.
C. Peat-Mining Without a CWA Permit is Likely a “Knowing”
CWA Violation
The Corps has put Hawkes on notice that its parcel contains
jurisdictional waters through the AJD. Combined with the strict liability
nature of the CWA, which expressly prohibits “discharges” into statutory
“navigable waters,”119 Hawkes would be in “knowing” violation of the CWA
and acting in bad faith120 if it were to commence peat mining on its land. This
would subject Hawkes to up to “$37,500 per day per violation” and potential
criminal liability of up to three years imprisonment.121 As the Corps argues,
and Belle held, because a looming agency enforcement action does not
automatically trigger these penalties, there is no statutory or regulatory
restriction limiting the Corps’ ability to begin tolling penalties from when the
landowner begins to knowingly violate the CWA.122 Given the costs and time
required to go through the CWA permit process,123 and the $1.7 billion the
EPA generates collecting permitting fees and CWA penalties annually,124 the
agencies have strong incentives to force a landowner through the permitting
process. The Kent Recycling court and the district court in Hawkes were
incorrect when they held that a landowner may mine without a permit and
incur no penalties; a landowner may, in fact, be subject to penalties for
knowingly violating the CWA.
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D. If Hawkes Pursued a CWA permit, It Would Do So At a Disadvantage
Compared to Other Applicants
Hawkes is at a disadvantage compared to other permit applicants
because it would have to overcome a presumption in litigation that:
“[N]o discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted
if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge
which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic
ecosystem . . . therefore the Corps may not issue a permit
because there are “alternatives that would have less adverse
impact.”125
An AJD requires a landowner to prove why he or she should be
granted a permit for discharging dredged or fill material when there are
alternative uses of the parcel that would not affect jurisdictional waters.126
Applicants without an AJD would not have to overcome such a presumption,
thus hindering Hawkes. The Kent Recycling court ignores Supreme Court
precedent on this issue when it says that a landowner who has received an
AJD is in the same position as a CWA permit applicant who has not received
an AJD. In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Hawkes acknowledged the great
time and cost associated with applying for a permit and the potential liability
that a landowner may create for himself or herself by peat mining without a
permit. Combined with the presumption that a landowner with an AJD has to
overcome a higher burden in subsequent litigation compared to CWA
applicants without an AJD, the Eighth Circuit in Hawkes properly recognizes
the legal effect an AJD has on a landowner.
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E. The Corps’ Position is Inapposite to the CWA and APA’s Presumption
of Judicial Review
The Corps’ position is inapposite to the CWA and APA’s
presumptions of judicial review. The APA intends that judicial review be
widely available to contest federal agency decisions.127 The Corps’ attempt to
preserve its broad discretion in defining jurisdictional waters of the United
States at the cost of a landowner’s free use of his or her land is done in
opposition to the CWA and APA’s presumptions of judicial review. The
APA is consistent with Congress’ intent to have broad judicial review of
agency actions.128
As a result, absent a “showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a
contrary legislative intent,” judicial review requests should be interpreted as
strongly favoring granting judicial review.129 The Corps has yet to argue that
judicial review is contrary to congressional intent. The absence of such an
argument by the Corps indicates that the Corps is likely aware that arguing
so, as Justice Breyer stated, is in open disregard to “seventy five years of
settled APA law that presumes that final agency action is reviewable.”130 The
Sackett court also explained that, “the APA’s presumption of judicial review
is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all.”131
The Supreme Court should acknowledge that the Corps has not provided
clear and convincing evidence that granting judicial review is contrary to the
APA’s or the CWA’s legislative intent. As a result, the Court has an
opportunity here to agree with Hawkes because the Eighth Circuit’s decision
is consistent with the acts’ legislative intent.
127
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F. The Eighth Circuit in Hawkes Correct Correctly Applied
Sackett v. E.P.A.
The Eighth Circuit in Hawkes correctly applied the Sackett v. E.P.A.
holding, while the Kent Recycling court mischaracterized Sackett. The Kent
Recycling court and the Hawkes district court held that Sackett is
distinguishable because Sackett involved a landowner seeking judicial review
of an EPA enforcement action that required the landowner to take affirmative
action on her property. The courts, however, mischaracterize the basis upon
which the Sackett court made its decision. In determining that Sackett lacked
no adequate remedy other than judicial review, the Court explained that
“there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed
to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’
without the opportunity for judicial review — even judicial review of the
question whether the regulated party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction.”132
The Sackett court plainly stated that review of the question whether a
party is within the EPA’s jurisdiction may be reviewed judicially. This
defeats the Corps’ argument and the Kent Recycling court’s holding that an
AJD is not binding on a landowner. Enforcement of such a determination
only comes with future agency action because Sackett acknowledges that the
core issue in determining whether or not a compliance order is judicially
reviewable is “whether [the] EPA had authority to assert CWA jurisdiction
over the [landowner]’s land.”133 It is clear that the Eighth Circuit in Hawkes
correctly applied Sackett, and the Supreme Court should make this clear by
affirming Hawkes.
G. Judicial Review of AJD Protects a Landowner’s Rights Against
Otherwise Unfettered Agency Discretion
The Corps and the EPA’s decentralized and expansive definition of
what parcels of land are sufficiently connected to jurisdictional “waters of the
United States” is a standard that infringes upon a landowner’s use of his or
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her land.134 The Corps argued that Hawkes’s parcel was sufficiently
connected to “waters of the United States” via a series of unnamed culverts
and streams spanning 120 miles.135 Such a determination is difficult for a
landowner to anticipate. The Corps’ AJD also seems to minimally protect the
bodies of water over which the CWA has jurisdiction given the significant
degree of attenuation between the parcel and jurisdictional waters. The CWA
does not grant the Corps jurisdiction over all water in the United States, nor
any piece of land upon which water travels.136
As the Supreme Court stated in Rapanos v. United States, in the last
30 years, the agencies have expanded their jurisdiction “to cover 270-to-300
million acres of swampy lands in the United States – including half of Alaska
and an area the size of California.”137 This expansive definitional power
allows the agencies to generate nearly two billion dollars in permitting fees
and CWA fines. 138 The Corps’ current practice also forces landowners to
expend costs to hire environmental experts or to depend on local Corps’
officials’ determinations on whether or not their parcel is subject to CWA
permitting. This process is confusing and AJD outcomes are unpredictable.
Allowing the Corps to retain unfettered authority in deciding whether it has
jurisdiction over a parcel significantly diminishes a landowner’s use of his or
her land. As a result, the Supreme Court should affirm the Eighth Circuit that
judicial review is an appropriate limitation upon the Corps and the EPA’s
regulatory power.
H. Judicial Review of AJD Incentivizes the Corps to Ensure the Accuracy
of its Determinations
Judicial review of AJD serves as an incentive for local Corps offices
to ensure the accuracy of their determinations. The agencies should also take
greater efforts to ensure the accuracy of their AJD to avoid spending
government resources defending against landowners who seek judicial
review of an AJD. The agencies could avoid frequent judicial review of AJDs
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by creating a second administrative appeal for landowners to contest an AJD.
Allowing a landowner to have a second administrative appeal would likely
increase the accuracy of AJDs and lower the number of cases landowners file
against the agencies for judicial review.
An additional internal appeal procedure would also increase revenue
the agencies could make in the CWA permitting process. While increased
permitting costs are somewhat harmful to applicants, paying for a second
administrative appeal would likely be cheaper than suing the Corps in federal
court. However, the decentralized organization of the Corps makes it difficult
to compare the Corps’ current practice to the appeal and permitting
procedures of other federal agencies. Adding this appeal step would greater
protect a landowner’s rights and likely avoid outcomes like in Hawkes.
Regardless of whether the agencies adopt a second administrative appeal
procedure, judicial review of AJD serves as an effective mechanism for
ensuring the quality of a Corps’ AJD and it protects landowners from the
potential burdens of an affirmative AJD.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should affirm the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Hawkes and effectively disagree with Kent Recycling. The six above legal
arguments strongly indicate that an AJD affects a landowner’s legal rights
and obligations. This outcome is not only legally correct, but it also creates
the proper limitations on the broad discretion agencies have over the
definition of “waters of the United States” that protect landowners’ rights.
Judicial review also incentivizes the Corps to make accurate AJDs because
otherwise the Corps will be subject to judicial scrutiny of its decisions. In
addition, the agencies could adopt a second administrative appeal. This
would better protect a landowner’s rights and generate more revenue for the
agencies. However, given that such an additional administrative appeal
procedure is uncommon, the agencies may not consider this option.
Regardless, judicial review of AJDs should remain available to landowners to
protect their rights, and the Supreme Court can ensure this by affirming the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Hawkes.
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